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Abstract 
Four experiments test the prediction that feelings of power lead individuals to discount advice 
received from both experts and novices. Experiment 1 documents a negative relationship 
between subjective feelings of power and use of advice. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that 
individuals experiencing neutral and low levels of power weigh advice from experts and 
experienced advisors more heavily than advice from novices, but individuals experiencing high 
levels of power discount both novice and expert advice. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that 
this tendency of individuals experiencing high levels of power to discount advice from experts 
and novices equally is mediated by feelings of competitiveness (Experiment 3) and confidence 
(Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, Experiment 4 shows that inducing high power individuals to feel 
cooperative with their advisors can mitigate this tendency, leading them to weigh expert advice 
more heavily than advice from novices. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed. 
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  Organizational leaders rarely make critical decisions in isolation. Instead, decision 
makers more often receive input from advisors from both within and outside their organizations. 
For example, in the process of making a critical strategic decision, a CEO might receive advice 
from various members of her board, her top management team, or from a team of consultants. 
This advice can have varying levels of impact on her ultimate decision. In some circumstances, 
she may ignore the advice completely; at other times, the advice she receives may influence her 
decision dramatically. Does the CEO’s relative power change her psychological openness to 
advice? Does the CEO’s relative power influence her sensitivity to more or less expert advice?   
  Research has identified three types of factors that influence individuals’ use of advice. 
First, characteristics of the judgment task affect the extent to which advice influences decisions. 
Specifically, research has indicated that decision makers weigh advice more heavily when the 
advice is costly to obtain (Gino, 2008; Patt, Bowles, & Cash, 2006) and when the task is difficult 
(Gino & Moore, 2007; Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009). Second, characteristics of the advisor can 
have an important influence on the extent of advice use. For example, research indicates that 
advice is weighted more heavily when advisors are relatively more experienced or 
knowledgeable than the decision makers (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; 
Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Yaniv, 2004; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007) and when the advisors express greater 
confidence in the quality of their advice (Lawrence & Warren, 2003; Phillips, 1999; Sniezek & 
Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; 
Yaniv & Foster, 1997). Finally, aspects of the decision maker’s internal states can impact the Power and Advice Taking  4 
 
extent of advice-taking. For example, decision makers weigh others’ opinions less heavily when 
they are feeling confident (see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006 for a review) or when experiencing 
incidental emotions that increase feelings of certainty, such as anger (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008).  
  In this article, we focus on a type of internal state that is of critical importance in decision 
making contexts: the decision maker’s subjective sense of power. A subjective sense of power 
refers to the extent to which individuals feel that they can exert influence over the outcomes and 
experiences of others (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Van Kleef, Oveis, Van der Lowe, LuoKogan, 
Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). Prior research on power has proposed that the sense of power has wide-
ranging psychological consequences (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). For example, 
recent work has found that the experience of power leads people to act more independently of 
others (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008) and to resist being 
influenced by the opinions and perspectives of others (Brinol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 
2007), thereby reducing the accuracy of their judgments (See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, in 
press). We suggest that not only does the experience of power lead individuals to be less open to 
using advice from others, but that power can lead individuals to discount advice even from 
individuals who have high levels of expertise.  
Power and Advice Taking 
  One of the most robust findings in the advice taking literature is that people exhibit 
egocentric advice discounting (Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) in that they 
underweight advice from others and over-weight their own opinions (see Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006 for a review). Scholars have argued that this discounting of advice is particularly likely to 
occur when decision makers perceive their own opinions to be superior to the opinions and 
perspectives of others (Krueger, 2003) and consequently feel a high level of confidence in their Power and Advice Taking  5 
 
ability to make an accurate judgment independently. This line of reasoning suggests that there 
will be a greater degree of advice discounting when the decision maker 1) feels optimistic that 
she will make a good decision, 2) feels that she has the decision under control, and consequently 
3) is confident about her own ability in the decision.  
  Recent research on the psychological effects of power indicates that individuals with a 
high subjective sense of power are likely to experience each of these three perceptions. First, 
power has been shown to produce a sense of optimism that leads individuals to perceive risky 
behaviors as less risky (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Specifically, high power individuals focus 
on the potential rewards, and ignore the potential downsides, of engaging in risky behaviors. As 
a result, they expect that, to a disproportionate extent, uncertain events will turn out in their 
favor. Second, recent research building on the illusion of control (Langer, 1975; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988; Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998) has found that power leads individuals 
to experience an inflated perception of personal control (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & 
Galinsky, 2009). Fast et al. (2009) propose that this perception may underlie a broad range of the 
psychological effects of power, including optimism, high self-esteem, and action-orientation. 
Third, research has shown that feelings of power increase individuals’ levels of confidence in 
their own opinions and perspectives (Brinol, et al., 2007; See, et al., 2010; Sivanathan & 
Galinsky, 2007).  
  Thus, the subjective experience of power leads people to be optimistic about the 
outcomes they can produce and to perceive that they have a high level of control over those 
outcomes; consequently, high power individuals tend to feel overconfident about their abilities. 
These findings imply that individuals who experience a high level of power are likely to feel that 
they do not need to rely on advice from others and therefore are likely to significantly discount Power and Advice Taking  6 
 
advice. At the same time, individuals with a low level of power are more likely to experience 
lower levels of optimism, a lower sense of control, and less confidence, leading them to feel a 
greater need for input from others and therefore to be more willing to take advice. This line of 
reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The experience of power will be associated with lower weighting of 
advice, such that advice will be weighted less heavily by individuals experiencing a high 
level of power and more heavily by individuals experiencing a low level of power.  
The Role of Advisor Experience and Expertise 
  Individuals commonly weigh advice received from experienced and knowledgeable 
advisors more heavily than advice received from advisors with less experience or expertise 
(Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, 
& Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). Although 
this research has focused on advice taking in dyadic interactions, related studies have examined 
the influence of knowledgeable and expert team members and have found similar effects on 
decision quality in team settings (see Hollenbeck, Ilgen, LePine, Colquitt, & Hedlund, J., 1998; 
Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, & Phillips, 1995; Humphrey, Hollenbeck, Meyer, & 
Ilgen, 2002). Research in this area suggests that individuals discount the advice of others because 
they presume their own judgments to be superior to the judgments of others (Krueger, 2003). As 
a result, one would expect that when decision makers are presented with evidence that their 
advisor may have access to superior information or possess more expertise, they would be more 
inclined to listen to advice.  
Therefore, we expect that individuals who experience a low level of power will give 
more weight to information from expert advisors than from novice advisors. However, we expect Power and Advice Taking  7 
 
a different dynamic to emerge for high power decision makers. Specifically, we expect that high 
power individuals will be insensitive to the level of an advisor’s expertise, such that they will 
discount advice from novices and experts equally. We expect high power individuals to discount 
novice and expert advice equally because we predict that powerful decision makers will feel 
competitive with expert advisors. These competitive feelings lead to enhanced confidence, which 
in turn leads to advice discounting.  
To understand why power would lead individuals to feel competitive with expert 
advisors, it is necessary to consider the nature of power in more detail. An individual’s power in 
a particular social situation refers to the individual’s relative ability to control others’ outcomes, 
experiences, or behaviors (Keltner, et al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Because power is 
relative, it is a property of the relations between or among individuals rather than a property of 
the individual alone (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). As such, the 
power relationship between two individuals can change when aspects of the social situation 
change. According to power-dependence theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962), ―the power of A 
over B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B upon A‖ (Emerson, 1962: 32-33). Thus, 
if B manages to decrease his or her dependence on A, then A loses power over B. Social 
dynamics can change power dynamics and lead the powerful to lose power. 
Advising is a social process that can have an impact on power dynamics. In an advising 
context, the power of both the advisor and the decision maker can vary, and one important 
determinant of the power of the advisor is the advisor’s expertise (French & Raven, 1959). 
Expertise is a source of power for advisors because advice from experts is likely to be in higher 
demand than advice from novices. Furthermore, when an advisor has high expertise, the advisor 
is likely to have information that is valued by the decision maker. In this way, the advisor’s Power and Advice Taking  8 
 
expertise increases the dependence of the decision maker on the advisor. Thus, expertise shifts 
the balance of power in the advisor’s favor.  
On the surface, it may therefore appear that receiving unsolicited advice from an expert 
would eliminate the negative effect of power on the weighting of advice: In the face of advice 
from an expert, an otherwise powerful decision maker would feel diminished and accept the 
advice. However, we expect the dynamic to be more complicated because powerholders do not 
relinquish their power easily. Previous research has shown that power is associated with an 
enhanced level of competitiveness (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). To preserver power, 
high power individuals often look for traits or characteristics in others that they can construe as 
justifying their disproportionate amount of power (e.g., Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 
2000; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998). Because the desire to maintain power is driven in part 
by self-enhancement (Pfeffer & Fong, 2005), an affront to the self-esteem of high power 
individuals is likely to result in the powerholder experiencing feelings of aggression toward the 
source of the threat (Fast & Chen, 2009). 
Based on these findings, we expect that, rather than passively accepting a diminished 
sense of power, individuals who feel a high subjective sense of power will react with feelings of 
competitiveness when faced with unsolicited advice from experts. This competitiveness 
represents an intention to establish their superiority to the advisor, which has the effect of 
refuting the advisor’s relative expertise and thus re-affirming their own entitlement to power. 
Indeed, given the relative and perceptual nature of social power, a shift in the decision maker’s 
feelings of power can occur only if the decision maker chooses to acknowledge the value of the 
expertise that the advisor holds. Thus, although high power individuals are likely to resist advice 
from novices because it is low in utility and accuracy, high power individuals resist advice from Power and Advice Taking  9 
 
experts for defensive reasons: The expert status of the advisor is a challenge to their own 
standing.  
This line of reasoning is consistent with research indicating that under certain 
circumstances, advice is experienced as a threat to the decision maker’s independence and 
autonomy. For example, Goldsmith and Fitch (1997) found that in situations with salient power 
dynamics, such as parent-child relationships, advice is perceived as a threat to the knowledge or 
ability of the decision maker. Similarly, Koestner and colleagues (1999) found that individuals 
seeking to maintain independence and power resist the recommendations of others. In addition, 
Dalal and Bonaccio (2010) found that the motivation to preserve autonomy was enhanced when 
advice was unsolicited (see also Deelstra, et al., 2003).  
On the basis of these findings, we therefore propose that when confronted with an expert 
advisor, high power individuals will interpret the advice taking context as a competition over 
―who is right‖ and will consequently be motivated to out-perform the advisor. In addition, 
because this competitiveness stems from a motivation to deny the superior knowledge of the 
advisor, it is likely to be associated with an increase in confidence on the part of the decision 
maker. Previous research has found that competitive arousal increases decision biases, such as 
feelings of optimism and illusions of control (Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005; Malhotra, Ku, 
& Murnighan, 2008). Similarly, we expect that competitive arousal felt by high power 
individuals will increase optimism and illusions of control, leading to greater feelings of 
confidence. Thus, high power individuals’ competitive orientation toward expert advisors is 
likely to lead to a boost in self-confidence related to the decision task, which in turn leads 
powerholders to decrease the weight that they assign to the advice.  Power and Advice Taking  10 
 
  In summary, we expect that receiving advice from expert but not novice advisors leads 
high power individuals to experience a state of competitive arousal that enhances their 
confidence and therefore leads them to discount the advice of experts and novices equally (see 
Figure 1). The key implication of this line of reasoning is that individuals with neutral or low 
levels of power will replicate previous findings in which advice from expert advisors is weighted 
more heavily than advice from novices, but individuals with high levels of power will discount 
advice from novice and expert advisors alike. We therefore hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction between decision maker power and advisor 
expertise, such that individuals with neutral and low levels of power will weigh advice 
from expert advisors more heavily than advice from novice advisors, whereas individuals 
experiencing high levels of power will ignore advisor expertise and discount advice from 
all types of advisors equally.  
Consistent with the path model depicted in Figure 1, we further expect a pattern of moderated 
mediation in which the effect of power on advice taking is mediated by competitiveness and 
confidence for those who receive advice from an expert, but is not mediated by these variables 
for those receiving advice from a novice.  
Hypothesis 3: For individuals receiving advice from an expert, there will be an indirect 
mediating path from power to advice taking through competitiveness and confidence; this 
indirect path will not be significant for individuals receiving advice from a novice. 
Overview of Present Research 
  We tested our hypotheses in four experimental studies. Following the approach of other 
scholars in the advice taking literature (e.g., Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv, 2004), the studies 
employed different estimation tasks over multiple rounds. In the first study, we examined the Power and Advice Taking  11 
 
negative effect of power on the degree of advice weighting (Hypothesis 1). The remaining three 
studies then manipulated the expertise of the advisor by varying the advisor’s prior domain 
experience (Experiment 2) or level of past performance (Experiments 3 and 4). In Experiment 2, 
we examined our prediction that individuals experiencing low levels of power will weigh advice 
from experienced advisors more heavily than advice from novices, whereas individuals 
experiencing high levels of power will discount both types of advice to the same extent 
(Hypothesis 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, we sought to replicate this interaction focusing on 
expertise rather than experience as the moderator. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 also investigated 
our moderated mediation prediction (Hypothesis 3): In Experiment 3, we examined the roles of 
competitiveness and confidence in mediating the effect of power and advisor expertise on advice 
taking; in Experiment 4, we manipulated competitive orientation to further examine the 
dynamics of the causal chain. 
Experiment 1: Power and Advice Taking 
In Experiment 1, we first asked people to engage in an estimation task over multiple 
rounds. We then manipulated whether participants experienced a high versus low sense of 
power. We also included a control condition. After the power manipulation, participants engaged 
in the repeated estimation task once again but this second time they also received advice from 
others. We expected to find a negative relationship between power and advice weighting 
(Hypothesis 1), such that people experiencing a high level of power would weigh advice less 
heavily and individuals experiencing low levels of power would weigh advice more heavily than 
did participants in the control condition.  
Method Power and Advice Taking  12 
 
Participants. One hundred seven students (53 female, Mage=21, SD=2.47) at a private 
university in the eastern United States participated in the study for pay. Participants received a $2 
show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn an additional $6 during the study. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: high power, low power, and control.  
Design and procedure. Participants sat in private computer cubicles. To mitigate 
potential demand effects, we informed participants that the experiment included two unrelated 
studies, a Vivid Writing Skills Study and a Weight Estimation Study (two parts). 
Weight estimation study (Part I). In Part I of the Weight Estimation Study, participants 
completed a repeated judgment task. In each of three rounds, participants saw a picture of a 
person and estimated the person’s weight. Participants had an incentive to be accurate; we 
informed participants that they would receive $1 if their estimate fell within 10 pounds of the 
actual weight of the person in the picture.  
Vivid writing skills study. We referred to this segment of the experiment as the Vivid 
Writing Skills Study. As in prior studies that manipulated power (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003), participants engaged in a writing task. Based on the experimental condition, 
participants were asked to recall a situation in which they had power over other people (high 
power), a situation in which other people had power over them (low power), or their last visit at 
the grocery store (control), and to write the details of the situation (see Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, 
& Galinsky, 2008). Consistent with the definition of power as an individual’s relative ability to 
control others’ outcomes, experiences, or behaviors, the instructions used in the high [low] power 
condition read as follows:  
Please think about a time when you had power over someone [when someone had power 
over you]. By power, we mean a situation in which you [this person] controlled the 
ability of another person or persons [your ability] to get something they [you] wanted, or Power and Advice Taking  13 
 
were in a position to evaluate those individuals [you]. Please write 4-5 sentences 
describing this situation in which you had [did not have] power. 
 
In the control condition, instead, participants received the following instructions: 
Please think about the last time you were at the supermarket shopping for yourself. Please 
write 4-5 sentences describing this situation and one item or product that you purchased 
for yourself. 
 
Weight estimation study (Part II). After finishing the writing task, participants 
completed Part II of the Weight Estimation Study. We showed participants the same three 
pictures they saw in Part I of the Weight Estimation Study, and we again asked participants to 
estimate the weight of the three different people. This time, however, we provided participants 
with the estimates that another participant had purportedly made for the same set of photos. For 
consistency, we kept the three advice values constant across conditions. We explained that these 
values had been randomly chosen from estimates that participants in a previous study had made 
when they were assigned to the role of advisor and were paid based upon the accuracy of their 
estimates. In each round, the advice was of good quality since it fell within 5% of the true weight 
of the person in each photograph. 
Dependent measure. As in prior advice-taking research, we measured the extent to which 
participants relied upon advice by using the ―weight of advice‖ (WOA) measure. This measure 
gauges the extent to which participants revised their estimates in the direction of the advisor’s 
estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Foster, 1997). The WOA ratio is equal to 0 when the 
advice has no influence on the final estimate, and to 1 when the final estimate is exactly the same 
as the advice.
1 We measure WOA with the following fraction:  
 
. 
WOA= 
(final estimate – initial estimate) 
(advice – initial estimate) Power and Advice Taking  14 
 
To maximize the value of advice, participants who are equally well informed should equally 
weight their own and another person’s estimate (WOA = 0.5) (Soll & Larrick, 2009). We note 
that prior research has often considered absolute values when computing the WOA measure. For 
robustness, across all studies, we conducted the analyses using the absolute value approach as 
well; the nature and significance of our results did not change. 
Results 
We conducted analyses that included gender and age as independent variables. We found 
no main effects or interaction effects for these demographic variables, and we report our findings 
collapsed across demographic groups.
2  
The mean values of WOA by condition are depicted in Figure 2. A 2-way mixed 
ANOVA with 1 between-subjects factor (recipient’s power: high vs. low) and 1 within-subject 
factor (3 rounds of estimates) found that advice use varied across condition (F[2,104]=16.95, 
p<.001,  ηp
2=.25): Consistent with Hypothesis 1, advice use in the high power condition was 
significantly lower than in both the control condition (p=.034) and the low power condition 
(p<.001); furthermore, advice use in the low power condition was significantly higher than in the 
control condition (p<.001).  
Soll and Larrick (2009) found that the distribution of WOA was trimodal, with peaks at 
ignoring advice completely (WOA = 0), averaging (WOA ≈ .5), and listening to advice 
completely (WOA = 1). The strategy of completely ignoring advice is a common one (Soll & 
Larrick, 2009) and particularly interesting as an expression of power. Thus, to further explore 
Hypothesis 1, we examined the frequencies with which advice was ignored completely. 
Participants in the high power condition ignored the advice (WOA = 0) on 65.6% of their 
judgments, which was significantly more than the proportions in the control condition (34.2%, p Power and Advice Taking  15 
 
< .001 by two-tailed Fisher exact test) and in the low power condition (25.7%, p < .001 by two-
tailed Fisher exact test). Participants in the control condition ignored advice at a marginally 
higher rate than did participants in the low power condition (p = .10 two-tailed Fisher exact 
test).
3      
Discussion 
These findings support our prediction that power leads individuals to be less receptive to 
others’ advice. Specifically, our analyses demonstrated that advice weight was lowest for 
individuals in the high power condition, moderate for those in the control condition, and highest 
for those in the low power condition. High power participants completely ignored advice almost 
two-thirds of the time—a rate nearly twice that observed in the other conditions. This finding is 
consistent with our argument that power leads people to feel higher levels of optimism and 
control that in turn produce feelings of overconfidence and a disinclination to use advice from 
others. In our second study, we sought to replicate the finding of a main effect of power on 
advice use and to demonstrate that the tendency for high power individuals to discount advice 
from others extends even to advice from more experienced individuals. 
Experiment 2: Power, Advisor Experience, and Advice Taking 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that individuals primed with high feelings of power were less 
open to others’ advice compared to individuals with low feelings of power or individuals in a 
control condition. In Experiment 1, participants received advice attributed to a randomly chosen 
participant from a previous study. This description provided no direct information about the 
relative ability of the advisor. Experiment 2 tested whether the same results would hold when 
advice is received from an experienced rather than inexperienced advisor. We expected that there 
would be an interaction between the participant’s level of power and the advisor’s experience, Power and Advice Taking  16 
 
such that participants experiencing low or neutral levels of power would weigh advice from 
experienced advisors more heavily than advice from novices. The tendency to give more weight 
to more able advisors replicates many past results (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Feng & 
MacGeorge, 2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Soll & Larrick, 
2009; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). However, we 
expected that participants experiencing a high level of power would preserve their sense of 
power by discounting advice from experienced advisors and novices equally (Hypothesis 2). 
Study 2 was designed to test for this interaction.    
Method 
Participants. One hundred thirty-two students (62 female, Mage=21, SD=2.03) at a 
private university in the eastern United States participated in the study in exchange for a $2 
show-up fee and the opportunity to earn an additional $6.  
Design and procedure. We randomly assigned participants to one of four experimental 
conditions from a 2 (Recipient’s power: high vs. low) x 2 (Advisor’s experience: experienced vs. 
inexperienced) between-subjects design.  
In Experiment 2, we used a different estimation task than the one we used in Experiment 
1. Across three rounds, participants viewed a photograph of a jar filled with coins and estimated 
the amount of money in each jar. In both Part 1 and Part 2 of the estimation task, participants 
received an additional $1 if their estimate fell within 25 cents of the true amount in the jar.  
In Experiment 2 we also introduced a new manipulation: advisor’s experience. 
Participants were told that the advice was a randomly selected estimate from participants in a 
previous study who were assigned the role of advisor and were paid based on the accuracy of 
their estimates. In addition, in the experienced-advisor condition, we told participants that their Power and Advice Taking  17 
 
advisors engaged in ten practice trials in which they received feedback on the accuracy of their 
estimates so that they could improve them over time. 
Prior to conducting this study, we conducted a pilot study with a non-overlapping sample 
of participants (N = 86). We asked these participants to view the same three photographs and to 
make estimates that they would offer as advice to future participants. We used the mean value 
from the pilot study as advice to participants in Experiment 2. 
Results 
We conducted a 3-way mixed ANOVA with 2 between-subjects factors (recipient’s 
power: high vs. low; advisor’s experience: high vs. low) and 1 within-subject factor (3 rounds of 
estimates). We found a main effect of power such that low power individuals were more 
receptive to advice (Mean WOA= 0.63, SD=0.38) than were high power individuals (Mean 
WOA=0.14, SD=0.31, F[1,128]=69.14, p<.001, ηp
2=.35). There was no main effect of advisor’s 
experience on advice use (F[1,128]=1.62, p=.21, ηp
2=.01). However, as predicted in Hypothesis 
2, there was a significant interaction between recipient’s power and advisor’s experience 
(F[1,128]=3.72, p=.056, ηp
2=.03). As depicted in Figure 3, low power individuals were more 
receptive to the advice of experienced advisors than to the advice of inexperienced advisors 
(F[1,63]=4.25, p<.05, ηp
2=.06), but high power individuals equally discounted advice 
independent of the advisor’s experience (p=.61).  
To further explore Hypothesis 2, we examined the frequencies with which advice was 
ignored completely depending on advisor experience. When advice came from novices, high 
power individuals ignored the advice (WOA = 0) on 67.7% of their judgments compared to 
23.3% of the judgments by low power individuals (p < .001 by two-tailed Fisher exact test). 
When advice came from experts, high power individuals ignored advice on 75.5% of their Power and Advice Taking  18 
 
judgments compared to just 9.4% of the judgments by low power individuals (p < .001 by two-
tailed Fisher exact test).
4 Low power individuals ignored advice significantly more for novice 
than for expert advisors (p < .01 by two-tailed Fisher exact test), but the rate at which high power 
individuals ignored advice did not differ by advisor expertise (p > .10). Overall power had the 
effect of closing judges to advice from all advisors, novice or expert.    
Discussion 
These findings are consistent with the results of Experiment 1 and indicate that power 
leads individuals to be less receptive to others’ advice. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 2, 
the findings showed that advice taking by low power individuals was sensitive to an advisor’s 
experience, whereas advice taking by high power individuals was not. Specifically, low power 
individuals were more receptive to the advice they received when it came from an experienced 
rather than inexperienced advisor. By contrast, high power individuals heavily discounted advice 
from any advisor regardless of the advisor’s level of experience. In Study 3, we conceptually 
replicate Study 2 by testing whether advisor expertise measured by past performance produces 
the same effects as advisor experience. In addition, we explore the role of competitiveness and 
confidence in mediating the effects of power and advisor ability on advice use.  
Experiment 3: Power, Advisor Expertise, and Advice Use 
Our first two studies demonstrated that individuals primed with high power were less 
open to others’ advice compared to individuals with low power, even when advice is received 
from an experienced rather than inexperienced advisor. The goal of Experiment 3 was twofold. 
First, we wanted to test whether an advisor’s expertise would produce the same results as an 
advisor’s level of experience (providing a second test of Hypothesis 2). Second, we wanted to Power and Advice Taking  19 
 
examine the roles of competitiveness and confidence in mediating the relationship between 
power and advice taking as a test of Hypothesis 3. 
 Method 
Participants. One hundred ninety-nine college and graduate students (67 male, Mage=23, 
SD=7.41) from local universities in a city in the Southern United States participated in the study 
in exchange for a $4 show-up fee and the opportunity to earn an additional $6.  
Design and procedure. We randomly assigned participants to one of six experimental 
conditions from a 3 (Recipient’s power: high vs. low vs. control) x 2 (Advisor’s expertise: expert 
advisor vs. novice advisor) between-subjects design. The study employed the same weight 
estimation task as in Experiment 1. We manipulated advisor’s expertise by giving participants 
information about the advisor’s performance (in terms of accuracy) in a prior session of the same 
study. In the expert-advisor condition, we told participants that the estimates were those of an 
advisor who was among the best performers in a previous session (specifically, in the top 5%). In 
the novice-advisor condition, we told participants that the estimates were those of an advisor 
who was among the average performers in a previous session (specifically, in the 50
th 
percentile). We used the same power manipulation employed in Experiments 1 and 2. 
After the second part of the Estimation Study we included a questionnaire with measures 
of state competitiveness and confidence. We randomized the order in which these questions were 
presented to participants. The questionnaire also included manipulation checks and demographic 
questions related to age and gender.  
Measures. Unless otherwise indicated, participants answered the questions with our 
measures by indicating their level of agreement on a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 
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Competitiveness. To measure competitiveness, we modified the competitiveness index 
scale suggested by Houston and colleagues (see Houston, Farese, & La Du, 1992; Smither & 
Houston, 1992) so that we could capture state competitive mindset. The scale included the 
following items: 1) Right now, I think that competing against an opponent would be enjoyable 
and 2) Right now, I think that keeping score is important when playing games. The two items 
were correlated at r=.73, p<.001, which corresponds to =.84 (M=4.95, SD=1.42).  
Confidence. We measured confidence by asking participants to indicate their level of 
agreement on a 7-point scale with the following three items: 1) I am very certain about the 
accuracy of my judgments, 2) I feel confident I performed well on this task, and 3) I have no 
doubt my estimates are close to the true values (=.89) (M=4.08, SD=1.33). The measures of 
confidence and competitiveness were positively correlated (r = .30, p < .001).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. We confirmed that all participants correctly recalled the 
information we provided regarding the advisor’s level of expertise. Specifically, participants in 
the expert advisor condition were able to indicate that their advisor was in the top 5% of 
performers, and participants in the novice advisor condition were able to indicate that their 
advisor was in the 50
th percentile. 
To test for the effect of the power manipulation, we asked participants to think back to 
the experience that they had written about at the beginning of the study, and to indicate the 
amount of power they personally felt in that experience using a 7-point scale (from 1=very little 
to 7=a great deal). We used their answers to this question as the dependent variable in a 3 
(recipient’s power) x 2 (advisor’s expertise) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed 
only a significant effect of power in the expected direction (F[2,193]=62.66, p<.001, ηp
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Participants reported higher ratings in the high power condition (M=5.27, SD=1.01) compared to 
both the control condition (M=4.73, SD=1.43; p<.04) and the low power condition (M=2.68, 
SD=1.60; p<.001), indicating that our manipulation of power was effective. The ratings of 
perceived power were significantly lower in the low power condition than in the control 
condition (p<.001). 
Advice-taking. We conducted a 3-way mixed ANOVA with 2 between-subject variables 
(recipient’s power: high, low, or neutral; advisor’s expertise: high vs. low) and 1 within-subject 
variable (3 rounds of estimates). We found a significant effect for power (F[2,179]=18.41, 
p<.001, ηp
2=.17) and a significant effect for advisor’s expertise (F[1,179]=17.27, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.09). More interestingly, as depicted in Figure 4, the interaction between recipient’s power 
and advisor’s expertise was also significant (F[2,179]=5.86, p<.01, ηp
2=.06). Low power 
individuals were more receptive to the advice of expert advisors than to that of novice advisors 
(F[1,179]=27.37, p<.001, ηp
2=.13). Participants in the control condition were also more receptive 
to the advice of expert advisors than to that of novice advisors, but this difference only reached 
marginal significance (F[1,179]=2.72, p=.10, ηp
2=.02). High power individuals, instead, equally 
discounted advice independent of the advisor’s expertise (p=.65). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was again 
supported.  
To further explore Hypothesis 2, we examined the frequencies with which advice was 
ignored completely depending on advisor expertise. When advice came from novices, high 
power individuals ignored the advice (WOA = 0) on 53.3% of their judgments compared to 
31.0% of the judgments by low power individuals (p < .001 by two-tailed Fisher exact test). 
When advice came from experts, high power individuals ignored advice on 56.0% of their 
judgments compared to just 6.7% of the judgments by low power individuals (p < .001 by two-Power and Advice Taking  22 
 
tailed Fisher exact test).
5 Low power individuals ignored advice from novices more than from 
experts (p < .001); high power individuals did not differ across experts and novices (p > .10). As 
in Study 2, power had the effect of closing judges to advice from all advisors, novice or expert.    
Explaining the link between power and advice taking. In order to test for support for 
the path model depicted in Figure 1, we focused only on the high power and the low power 
conditions since we were interested in the differences produced by these two levels of power on 
advice use. We followed the path-analysis procedures recommended by Edwards and Lambert 
(2007), which are implemented by running regressions on the mediators and the dependent 
variable and using the results of these regressions to generate a reduced form equation (i.e., that 
includes only exogenous variables as predictors), which is used to compute simple paths that 
constitute the indirect effect of the independent variable at different levels of the moderator 
variable. Below, we explain the results from the three constituent regressions in turn, and we 
then present the results for the indirect effects computed using the bootstrap procedure.  
We used hierarchical linear regression and began by regressing our measure of 
competitiveness on dummy variables for power (high power = 1; low power = 0) and advisor’s 
expertise (expert = 1; novice = 0) in the first step and found a significant effect of power (b=.66, 
t=2.74, p<.01). We then entered the interaction on the second step. Inclusion of the interaction 
term led to a significant increase in variance explained in the second step (from R
2=.06 to 
R
2=.09; p=.02) (b=1.16, t=2.37, p<.05). Contrast analyses revealed that there was a significant 
effect of power on competitiveness within the expert advisor condition (low power: M=4.32, 
SD=1.23; high power: M=5.70, SD=1.19; F[1,131]=12.78, p<.001, ηp
2=.09), but there was no 
simple effect of power within the novice advisor condition (low power: M=4.82, SD=1.50; high 
power: M=5.04, SD=1.37; F[1,131]=.55, p=.46, ηp
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that there was a marginally significant simple effect of advisor expertise within the high power 
condition (novice: M=5.04, SD=1.37; expert: M=5.70, SD=1.19; F[1,131]=3.38, p=.068, 
ηp
2=.03), but there was no simple effect of advisor within the low power condition (novice: 
M=4.82, SD=1.50; expert: M=4.32, SD=1.23; F[1,131]=2.24, p=.14, ηp
2=.02). These findings 
support our contention that the experience of power leads decision makers to experience feelings 
of competitiveness when they encounter an expert advisor. These findings also indicate support 
for the first stage of our proposed path model (Figure 1).  
Next, we tested our prediction for the second stage of our path model, in which we 
expected that there would be a main effect of competitiveness on confidence. To do so, we again 
used hierarchical linear regression. In the first step, we entered the dummy variable for power 
and found a significant effect of power on confidence (b=.54, t=2.38, p<.05). On the second step 
we entered our measure of competitiveness (centered) and found a significant effect of 
competitiveness on confidence (b=.36, t=3.19, p<.01). In the second step, the effect of power 
was no longer significant, indicating that the measure of competitiveness fully mediated the 
effect of power on confidence. We note that including the measure of competitiveness 
significantly improved the variance explained (from r
2=.04 to r
2=.11, F(1,132)=10.17, p<.01). 
These results support the second stage of our path model. 
To explore the third stage of our path model, in which we expected that there would be an 
effect of confidence on WOA, we again used hierarchical linear regression. In the first step, we 
entered the dummy variable for power and found a significant effect of power on WOA (b=-.23, 
t=-4.35, p<.001). In the second step, we entered our measure of confidence (centered), which 
was significant (b=-.10, t=-4.09, p<.001). We note that including the measure of confidence 
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explained (from r
2=.12 to r
2=.22, F(1,132)=16.78, p<.001). In addition, we wanted to confirm 
that our measure of confidence mediated the effect of competitiveness on WOA. To do so, we 
again used hierarchical linear regression. In the first step, we entered our measure of 
competitiveness (centered) and found a significant effect of competitiveness (centered) on WOA 
(b=-.06, t=-2.09, p<.04). In the second step, we entered our measure of confidence (centered), 
which was significant (b=-.11, t=-4.24, p<.001). We note that including the measure of 
confidence eliminated the effect of competitiveness on WOA (b=-.02, t=-0.84, p=.40) and 
significantly improved the variance explained (from r
2=.03 to r
2=.15, F(1,132)=17.98, p<.001). 
These results support the third stage of our path model.  
We then used the results of these three regressions to test whether the indirect effect of 
power through competitiveness and confidence was moderated by advisor’s expertise, as 
depicted in our path model (Figure 1). Specifically, we used a bootstrap procedure on the 
regressions of competitiveness, confidence, and WOA in order to construct bias-corrected 
confidence intervals based on 1,000 random samples with replacement from the full sample, as 
recommended by Edwards and Lambert (2007; see also MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; 
Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The analysis indicated that the indirect effect of power on WOA 
through competitiveness and confidence was significant for those in the expert advisor condition 
(bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.11 to -.02) but not for those in the novice advisor 
condition (bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.04 to .01) (see Table 1). Thus, Hypothesis 3 
was supported. In addition, we note that the direct effect of power on WOA was diminished but 
remained significant regardless of the advisor’s level of expertise, indicating that the mediation 
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Finally, our moderated mediation prediction entails an expectation that the causal chain 
from competitiveness to confidence to WOA should be significant when high power people 
receive advice from experts but should not be significant when high power people receive advice 
from novices. We tested this aspect of the expected causal chain using the bootstrap procedure 
on only our high power participants. The analysis confirmed a significant indirect effect from 
competitiveness to WOA through confidence when high power participants received advice from 
an expert (bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -.31 to -.05), and the indirect effect was not 
significant when the high power participants received advice from a novice (bias-corrected 95% 
confidence interval: -.09 to .03). Thus, the causal chain from competition to confidence to WOA 
is significant only among high power participants receiving advice from experts. This analysis 
provides additional support for Hypothesis 3.  
Discussion 
The results of our third study are consistent with those of Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants were more receptive to the advice of others when they experienced low power than 
when they experienced high power. Our results also show that advisor expertise only influences 
the extent of advice taking for participants experiencing low power; participants experiencing 
high power did not adjust their weight of advice according to the advisor’s expertise. In addition, 
our results further demonstrate that the effect of power on advice use is mediated by 
competitiveness and confidence for those receiving advice from experts. Specifically, when 
individuals received advice from experts, power significantly increased feelings of 
competitiveness, which in turn increased confidence and reduced advice-taking. However, high 
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facing novice advisors (and the indirect effect for those receiving advice from novices was not 
significant). Therefore, our path model based on Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Experiment 4: Power, Competitiveness, and Advice Use 
The results of Experiment 3 indicated that high power people feel competitive when 
exposed to advice from experts and that these feelings of competition lead them to inflate their 
confidence and underweight experts’ advice. Thus, one important implication of Study 3 is that 
when powerful people feel cooperative with their advisors, rather than competitive, they are 
likely to behave similarly to their lower power counterparts and weigh the advice of experts 
more heavily than advice from novices. In order to explore this possibility, and to examine our 
proposed causal mechanism in more detail, we conducted an additional study in which we 
exposed all participants to a high power prime and then manipulated both advisor expertise and 
feelings of competition vs. cooperation with the advisor.  
Thus, Experiment 4 involved a 2 (advisor expertise: expert vs. novice) x 2 (participant 
mindset: competitive vs. cooperative) between-subjects design, in which self-confidence was 
measured and all participants received the high power writing task. We expected an interaction 
between advisor expertise and participant mindset, such that in the competitive condition, 
participants (all of whom were high power) would discount advice from novices and experts 
equally (as in Experiments 2 and 3), but that in the cooperation condition, participants would 
weigh the advice of experts more heavily than advice from novices. Consistent with Hypothesis 
3 and the findings from Experiment 3, we expected that this interaction would be mediated by 
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Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and two adults (56% female, Mage=33.62, SD=11.47) 
participated in the study for pay. Participants received a $2 show-up fee and had the opportunity 
to earn an additional $6 during the study.  
Design and procedure. Participants completed the study online, at their own computer. 
To mitigate potential demand effects, we informed participants that the experiment included 
three unrelated studies: a Vivid Writing Skills Study, a Weight Estimation Study (two parts), and 
a final task described as either ―Cooperative Alliance Task‖ or ―Strategic Competition Task,‖ 
depending on condition. For the Vivid Writing Skills task, all participants received the high 
power version of the task. The study employed the same weight estimation task as in 
Experiments 1 and 3, and the same manipulation of advisor’s expertise used in Experiment 3.  
Before presenting the advisor’s estimates, however, we first described the fourth part of 
the study to participants. Participants were told that Part 4 of the study would require them either 
to work cooperatively with their advisor (cooperation condition) or to engage in a game in which 
they would compete with their advisor (competition condition). We also reinforced the strength 
of the manipulation by referring to the tasks with different titles (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 
2006). Specifically, the task was entitled ―Part 4: Cooperative Alliance Task‖ in the cooperative 
condition and ―Part 4: Strategic Competition Task‖ in the competitive condition. 
We then asked half of our participants to respond to a few brief questions to assess their 
confidence in their original estimates. The other half were not asked to respond to these 
questions until after they received their advisor’s advice and reported their own final estimates of 
the weights. This approach allowed us to test for mediation by assessing whether feelings of 
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estimates. We assessed self-confidence by asking participants to indicate their agreement with 
the following statements using a 7-point scale (scale: 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree): 1) 
I am very certain about the accuracy of my judgments; 2) I feel confident I performed well on 
this task; and 3) I have no doubt my estimates are close to the true values (α=.92). 
Next, we presented the advisors’ estimates and asked the participants to report their own 
final estimates. Once again, we kept the three advice values constant across conditions. After 
participants indicated their final estimates of the weights, we included a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire included measures of confidence (for those who did not respond to those items 
before their final estimates), as well as manipulation checks and demographic questions related 
to age and gender. We randomized the order in which these questions were presented to 
participants.  
Results 
Manipulation checks: advisor’s expertise. We confirmed that all participants correctly 
recalled the information we provided regarding the advisor’s level of expertise. Specifically, 
participants in the expert advisor condition were able to indicate that their advisor was in the top 
5% of performers, and participants in the novice advisor condition were able to indicate that their 
advisor was in the 50
th percentile. In addition, participants indicated how expert they believed 
their advisor to be on a 7-point scale (1=not at all, 7=very much). A 2 (advisor’s expertise: high 
vs. low) X 2 (task description: competition vs. cooperation) ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
advisor’s expertise, F(1,198)=111, p<.001, ηp
2=.36: Participants reported higher ratings in the 
expert advisor condition (M=5.33, SD=1.01) than in the novice advisor condition (M=3.76, 
SD=1.10), indicating that our manipulation of advisor’s expertise was effective. Both the main 
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Manipulation checks: competition toward advisor. We also confirmed that all 
participants correctly recalled the information we provided regarding whether they would be 
competing or cooperating with their advisor in the final task. Specifically, participants in the 
competition condition were able to indicate that they would compete with their advisor, and 
participants in the cooperation condition were able to indicate that they would cooperate with 
their advisor. In addition, participants indicated how cooperative or competitive they felt toward 
their advisor (1=very cooperative, 7=very competitive). A 2 (advisor’s expertise) X 2 (task 
description) ANOVA revealed a main effect for task description, F(1,198)=48.22, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.20: Participants reported higher ratings of competitiveness in the competition condition 
(M=4.91, SD=1.64) than in the cooperation condition (M=3.19, SD=1.86), indicating that our 
manipulation of competition toward the advisor was effective. Both the main effect of advisor’s 
expertise and the interaction were not significant (both Fs<1). 
Manipulation checks: power. We also included a question regarding participants’ 
experience of power. Participants were asked to think back to the experience that they wrote 
about at the beginning of the study, and to indicate the amount of power they personally felt in 
that experience on a 7-point scale (1=very little to 7=a great deal). The average rating was 5.47 
(SD=1.25). As expected given that our manipulations were introduced after the power induction, 
this rating was not affected by our manipulations. We then proceeded to test our hypotheses. 
Advice-taking. We conducted a 3-way mixed ANOVA with two between-subject 
variables (advisor’s expertise and task description) and one within-subject variable (3 rounds of 
estimates). We found a significant effect for advisor’s expertise (F[1,190]=14.91, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.07) and a significant effect for task description (F[1,190]=11.46, p=.001, ηp
2=.06). More 
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significant (F[1,190]=5.67, p<.02, ηp
2=.03). As was true for subjects experiencing high power in 
Experiments 2 and 3,  participants in Experiment 4 who expected to compete with their advisor 
discounted the advice of novice and expert advisors equally (F[1,190]=1.06, p=.30). However, 
participants who expected to cooperate with their advisor were more receptive to advice from 
experts than from novices (F[1,190]=20.10, p<.001, ηp
2=.10). Indeed, participants who received 
advice from experts with whom they expected to cooperate exhibited the highest level of WOA 
of the four cells (all p’s < .001). 
We also examined the frequencies with which advice was ignored completely. In the 
competition condition, participants ignored advice (WOA = 0) from novices on 37.0% of their 
judgments and ignored advice from experts on 38.7% of their judgments. In the cooperation 
condition, participants ignored advice from novices on 36% of their judgments and ignored 
advice from experts on 15.1% of their judgments (p < .001 by two-tailed Fisher exact test).
6    
Compared to the high power conditions in the previous studies, Experiment 4 revealed a 
lower rate of completely ignoring advice (WOA = 0).  Although we do not have a definitive 
explanation for this pattern, we note that the population was substantially different: Experiment 4 
involved an online sample of adults and not a college-based population.   
Confidence. We then examined whether our manipulations affected participants’ self-
reported level of confidence. A 2 (advisor’s expertise) X 2 (competition) ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect for advisor’s expertise (F[1,198]=5.05, p<.03, ηp
2=.03) and a significant effect 
for task description (F[1,198]=8.79, p<.01, ηp
2=.04). More interestingly, the interaction between 
the two manipulations was also significant (F[1,198]=6.11, p<.02, ηp
2=.03). Participants who 
expected to compete with their advisor reported feeling equally confident independent of 
whether the advisor was a novice or an expert (Mnovice=5.07, SD=1.19 vs. Mexpert=5.11, SD=1.40, Power and Advice Taking  31 
 
F[1,198]=0.02, p=.88). However, participants who expected to cooperate with their advisor 
reported feeling less confident when the advisor was an expert than when the advisor was a 
novice ( Mexpert=4.08, SD=1.31 vs. Mnovice=4.97, SD=1.46, F[1,198]=11.35, p=.001, ηp
2=.05). 
Indeed, participants who received advice from experts with whom they expected to cooperate 
exhibited the lowest levels of confidence of the four cells (all p’s =< .001). Controlling for the 
timing of these variables in our analyses did not substantively affect the results. 
First-stage moderated mediation model. We conducted additional analyses to examine 
whether self-reported confidence would explain the moderating effect of competition on the 
relationship between advisor’s expertise and advice taking for high power individuals. We 
expected that competition would moderate the effect of advisor’s expertise on self-reported 
confidence, which would directly predict higher levels of advice taking, constituting a first-stage 
moderation model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). To test for this effect, we used hierarchical 
linear regression in which we entered dummy variables for advisor expertise (expert = 1; novice 
= 0) and competition (competitive orientation = 1; cooperative orientation = 0) in the first step, 
the interaction between the two in the second step, and our measure of self-reported confidence 
in the third step. When the measure of confidence was included, the interaction between 
advisor’s expertise and competition became non-significant (b=-0.05, t=-0.72, p=.47), whereas 
self-reported confidence was a significant, negative predictor of advice taking (b=-.12, t=-9.36, 
p<.001). In addition, we used the bootstrap procedure recommended by Edwards and Lambert 
(2007) to assess the indirect effect of advisor expertise on WOA through confidence for 
individuals in the competition vs. cooperation conditions. Consistent with our causal model and 
with the finding reported above that there is no effect of advisor expertise on WOA for 
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expertise on WOA mediated by confidence for those in the cooperation condition but not among 
those in the competition condition. The analysis indicated that the indirect effect was significant 
for those in the cooperation condition (bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: 0.04 to 0.23) but 
not for those in the competition condition (bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: -0.10 to 0.09) 
(see Table 2). 
Discussion 
The results of our fourth study replicate the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 with respect 
to high power individuals and provide further support for our predicted causal mechanism. 
Specifically, Experiment 4 demonstrated that high power participants discount advice from 
experts and novices equally but that when high power participants are made to feel cooperative 
with their advisors, they weigh advice from experts more heavily. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate that high power participants who feel competitive with their expert advisors report 
increased feelings of confidence in their own judgments relative to high power participants who 
feel cooperative with experts. These feelings of confidence mediate the interactive effect of 
advisor expertise and competitive vs. cooperative orientation on WOA. Thus, the findings of 
Experiment 4 provide further support for our hypothesized causal model.   
In sum, the competitive feelings created in our manipulation reinforced the default 
mindset of high power decision makers—for them, taking advice from an expert would diminish 
their standing and they responded by reasserting their own competence. In contrast, a 
cooperative mindset led our high power participants to behave more like the low power or 
control participants from our previous experiments, exhibiting less confidence in their own 
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General Discussion 
  The four experiments presented here demonstrate that feelings of power lead individuals 
to decrease their use of advice from others and to discount advice from experts and novices 
equivalently. In Experiment 1, the findings confirmed that there is a negative relationship 
between subjective feelings of power and use of advice from others. In addition, Experiments 2, 
3, and 4 demonstrated that individuals experiencing high levels of power not only discounted 
advice from novice advisors, but also discounted advice from expert advisors. In contrast, 
individuals experiencing neutral and low levels of power in Experiments 2 and 3 exhibited 
behavior that was consistent with previous research findings: They weighed advice from experts 
and experienced advisors more heavily than advice from novices. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 
provided evidence supporting our causal mechanism. Experiment 3 found that high power 
individuals felt increased competitiveness and confidence when paired with an expert advisor. A 
moderated mediation analysis demonstrated that the tendency of high power individuals to 
discount advice from experts and novices equivalently is mediated by feelings of 
competitiveness and confidence. In Experiment 4, we manipulated competitive vs. cooperative 
orientation among high power individuals and demonstrated that the boost in confidence and 
consequent discounting of advice that high power decision makers exhibit when receiving advice 
from experts can be eliminated if the decision maker can be induced to feel cooperative, rather 
than competitive, with the advisor. 
Theoretical Contributions 
  We highlight four main theoretical contributions of this research, two with respect to 
research on advice and two with respect to research on power. First, the findings from these 
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have important influences on the extent of advice taking (e.g., Cooper, 1991; Gino & Schweitzer, 
2008). Previous work in this area has focused primarily on the influence of decision makers’ 
emotional states (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Our work extends this line 
of research by showing that the decision maker’s subjective sense of power is an important factor 
impacting the extent of advice use (see also See, et al., 2010). Second, our studies also provide 
insight about when and why this happens. Advice taking by high power individuals is less 
sensitive to advisor expertise than is advice taking by low power individuals. This happens 
because high power individuals experience greater competitiveness and confidence when they 
confront expert advisors, and these internal states mediate the link between power and advice 
use. 
  The research presented here also contributes in two key ways to research on the 
psychological effects of power. First, our findings from Experiment 3 extend previous research 
on the relationship between power and competitiveness. Specifically, prior studies have found 
that power increases competitive behavior in competitive social contexts, such as negotiations 
(Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Our findings provide further support for this dynamic 
but also extend previous findings by highlighting that high power individuals are more likely to 
perceive situations as competitive when their status, power, or influence are threatened (e.g., 
when confronted with someone with greater expertise). Second, our findings in Experiments 3 
and 4 also complement previous research on power and overconfidence (e.g., See et al., 2010; 
Sivanathan & Galinsky, 2007) by demonstrating that the effect of power on confidence may at 
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Implications for Practice 
  In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the fact that averaging judgments 
across people increases the accuracy of judgments (Clemen, 1989), which has been termed the 
―wisdom of crowds‖ (Surowiecki, 2004). An important insight from past research is that there 
are diminishing marginal returns to crowd size. For a given judgment, the first piece of advice is 
far more valuable than the second (or third, or fourth) piece of advice because it doubles the 
sample size (Hogarth, 1978). Research has shown, however, the people misunderstand the 
benefits of combining the estimates of two people (Larrick & Soll, 2006), and, in revising their 
own judgments, often ignore advice from others (WOA = 0), making their final estimates less 
accurate than if they had given equal weight to advice (WOA = .5) (Soll & Larrick, 2009). 
Although there are circumstances when ignoring advice is an effective strategy (for example, 
when the advisor has substantially less expertise than the advisee), it is a demonstrably inferior 
strategy to averaging when a judge and advisor are equally expert (Soll & Larrick, 2009). Under 
any reasonable assumption about differences in expertise, the high power individuals in 
Experiments 3 and 4 should be integrating the judgments of a ―top 5% expert‖ with their own 
judgments rather than ignoring the expert’s judgments.   
The tendency for power to reduce the use of advice suggests that organizational leaders 
should take steps to mitigate the negative effects of power. One way to do so may be to attempt 
to prevent subjective feelings of power from emerging in the first place. To that end, leaders may 
attempt to design work roles and responsibilities in ways that equalize power relations across 
organizational actors and promote non-hierarchical cultures. Alternatively, leaders could work to 
push decision making power as much as possible to the lower levels of organizational hierarchy. 
There is a general logic for decentralizing decisions because it allows people with the best Power and Advice Taking  36 
 
information to make key organizational decisions. A secondary benefit of decentralization may 
be psychological: Decisions will be made by people who feel less powerful and are therefore 
more open to advice from others.  
  In addition, organizational leaders could also take steps to minimize the likelihood of 
high power individuals experiencing feelings of competitiveness with advisors. This goal might 
be achieved by structuring tasks such that high power individuals are induced to feel a 
cooperative orientation to their advisors, as in Experiment 4. This goal may also be achieved by 
taking action to provide decision makers with feelings of security about their status and position 
so that exposure to experts is experienced as less threatening. This type of reassurance could 
occur by training advisors to affirm the knowledge and experience of the decision maker as a 
step to making their advice more impactful. At the same time, the goal of diminishing feelings of 
competitiveness could also be accomplished by choosing decision makers who are relatively 
more self-assured and who feel the effects of competitive arousal less acutely (Malhotra, Ku, & 
Murnighan, 2008). 
  We conclude by noting that although listening to advice is an effective way to form more 
accurate judgments, there is a potential social cost: Relying on others can be perceived as a sign 
of incompetence or uncertainty (Lee, 1997; Westphal, 1999). Those who hold power and want to 
maintain it may in fact be acting appropriately to preserve their social dominance. To combat the 
potential social costs of taking advice, organizations need to create cultures in which 
organizational members are encouraged to share information and leaders are rewarded for 
seeking and integrating the perspectives of others.   Power and Advice Taking  37 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
  There are multiple avenues of future research that could explore the limitations and 
boundary conditions of our findings. Specifically, we focus on the effects of power on the use of 
unsolicited advice. However, it would be interesting to explore whether power also has similar 
effects on the likelihood that advice will be sought in the first place: Are individuals who 
experience an enhanced feeling of power also less likely to seek advice? If such an effect exists, 
is it also mediated by competiveness and confidence? Furthermore, once advice has been 
solicited, would the effect of power on weight of advice persist? We suspect that it would not: 
When a high power person solicits advice from another, the very act of soliciting advice can be 
viewed as an affirmation of the decision maker’s high-power status, and it is likely that this 
affirmation could minimize the feelings of competitiveness that would otherwise emerge due to 
status threat.  
  In addition, our manipulation of power focused primarily on a particular type of power. 
French and Raven (1959) distinguish among reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent 
forms of power. Our manipulation of power (―By power, we mean a situation in which you 
controlled the ability of another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a 
position to evaluate those individuals‖) focused on reward power, which refers to an actor’s 
ability to control the rewards others receive, and coercive power, which refers to an actor’s 
ability to punish others. We suspect that the effect of power on expert and novice advice use may 
vary across bases of power. If the decision maker’s power is based on expertise, then the threat 
of advice from experts may be particularly high, leading to an even greater tendency to discount 
advice. However, if the decision maker’s power is based on legitimate (power based on others’ 
perceptions that the decision maker has lawful authority) or referent power (power based on Power and Advice Taking  38 
 
attraction and identification), then expert advice may represent less of a status threat, and perhaps 
the effects demonstrated in our studies would be mitigated.  
  The nature of the power manipulation used in our studies also prompts us to consider 
another potential boundary condition of these effects. Specifically, we used a writing prime to 
elicit individuals’ subjective feelings of power unrelated to the experimental task. This approach 
raises the question of whether the competitiveness that our high power individuals felt in 
response to expert advice would necessarily emerge among individuals who have achieved 
authority positions in organizations. Certainly individuals in positions of authority are frequently 
primed with power by cues in their environments, such as the deferential behavior of others and 
the high status perks associated with their offices. However, might individuals in positions of 
authority become accustomed or habituated to these cues, such that these cues no longer elicit the 
subjective feelings of power that were the focus of our experimental manipulations? If so, we 
would not expect our findings to generalize broadly to every decision made by an individual in a 
position of power; instead, we would only expect that our findings would generalize in those 
circumstances in which the powerful individual experiences a subjective awareness or feeling of 
power.  Similarly, it is possible that the writing prime approach to the manipulation of power 
elicited rather tenuous feelings of power, making our participants particularly susceptible to 
feelings of threat when confronted with an expert. This observation suggests that our results 
would be less robust among individuals who feel highly secure in their position of power or 
whose power bases are quite solidified; future research should investigate these possibilities. 
  Other interesting avenues of inquiry remain as well. For example, we did not examine the 
effect of power on judgment quality: Does the tendency for high power individuals to discount 
advice from experts lead to a decrease in judgment quality? We expect that it does, but future Power and Advice Taking  39 
 
research should explore this issue. It would also be interesting to explore whether the experience 
of power makes people more open to advice under some circumstances. Previous research 
indicates that high power individuals are strategic in their interactions, such that they allocate 
attention to those whom they perceive as instrumental to their goals but ignore individuals whom 
they perceive as less useful in their goal pursuits (e.g., Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 
2008; Overbeck & Park, 2006). This line of reasoning suggests that high power individuals may 
be more willing to seek and use advice from individuals who have expertise that is clearly 
instrumental to their goal pursuits (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009). Finally, it would be interesting to 
explore the role of feelings of power in prompting advice provision: Are high power individuals 
more likely to give advice than are individuals with lower levels of power?  
Conclusions 
Other people are a source of broader perspectives and differing opinions. Acquiring this 
information is arguably the easiest way to improve one’s decisions (Larrick, 2009). But do 
people listen to others? Individuals with formal positions of authority are generally granted broad 
decision-making authority and would benefit from listening to others; however, formal authority 
itself can create feelings of power, competitiveness, and confidence that inhibit advice taking. 
The studies presented here represent a first step toward a better understanding of a paradox of 
power—greater decision rights are often coupled with a power-induced neglect of the judgments 
of others. The findings have important theoretical implications for advice taking research and for 
research on the psychological effects of power, and they also have important practical 
implications for mitigating the negative effect of power on advice taking.  Power and Advice Taking  40 
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Footnotes 
1 In Experiments 1 and 2, no participants guessed the same weight as the advice across 
rounds, and all values for WOA were within the range -1 to 1. In Experiment 3 there was one 
person who guessed the same weight as the advice for the third target (none for the first two); 
that participant’s WOA for that target was removed from the computation of their average WOA. 
In addition, there were 15 people with WOA>1 or <-1 for the first target, 3 for the second target, 
and 23 for the third target. These were treated as WOA=1 (or -1 for negative values) in 
computing the average WOA as in previous research (e.g., Gino et al., 2009). In Experiment 4, 
there was one person who guessed the same weight as the advice for the first target and one 
person for the third target (none for the second target); that participant’s WOA for that target was 
removed from the computation of their average WOA. In addition, there were 6 people with 
WOA>1 or <-1 for the first target, 5 for the second target, and 11 for the third target. These were 
treated as WOA = 1 (or -1 for negative values) in computing the average WOA. In addition, 
WOA values greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean were excluded from the analyses. 
2 We coded participants’ essays to determine whether they included any mention of 
competitive content. Specifically, two independent raters (who were blind to the study 
hypotheses) read each essay and then indicated whether it described a competitive situation or 
not. Similar to the coding of the power prime essays described in Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee (2003), participants described different types of relationships (e.g., teacher-student, 
employer-employee). Yet, independent of the relationship described or the experimental 
condition, the results of the coding indicated that participants’ essays did not include competitive 
content. Power and Advice Taking  49 
 
3 High power and control participants rarely used advice in place of their own opinion 
(WOA = 1)—3.0% and 8.1% of the time, respectively—whereas low power individuals used 
advice in place of their own opinion frequently—37.8% of the time. Participants differed little in 
their use of averaging (.4 < WOA < .6), ranging from 8% to 16% across the 3 cells. 
4 High power individuals rarely used novice and expert advice in place of their own 
opinion (WOA = 1)—9.1% and 8.8% of the time, respectively—whereas low power individuals 
used novice and expert advice in place of their own opinion more often—30.3% and 50.0% of 
the time, respectively. Participants differed little in their use of averaging, ranging from 0% to 
13% across the 4 cells. 
5 High power individuals rarely used novice and expert advice in place of their own 
opinion (WOA = 1)—3.8% and 6.7% of the time, respectively—whereas low power individuals 
used novice and expert advice in place of their own opinion more often—20.0% and 34.7% of 
the time, respectively. Participants differed little in their use of averaging, ranging from 10% to 
16% across the 4 cells. 
6 Participants in the competition condition rarely used novice and expert advice in place 
of their own opinion (WOA = 1)—6.0% and 6.9% of the time, respectively. Participants in the 
cooperation condition rarely used novice advice in place of their own opinion (9.3% of the time), 
but participants in the cooperation condition used expert advice in place of their own 17.6% of 
the time. Participants differed little in their use of averaging, ranging from 12.1% to 17.6% 
across the 4 cells. 
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Table 1 
Differences in effects for moderated mediation analyses (Study 3) 
 
  
 
 
First stage effect of  
Power on 
Competitiveness 
 
Indirect effect of 
Power on WOA 
through 
Competitiveness 
and Confidence  
 
Novice 
 
0.22 
 
-.01 
 
Expert  1.38***  -0.05*** 
 
Difference  1.16**  -.04*** 
 
Note: entries are non-standardized regression coefficients.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 2 
Experiment 4: Analysis of Simple Effects  
 
Moderator:    Stage  Effect 
Competition    First  Second  Direct  Indirect  Total 
   Cooperation (0)    -.89**  -.13**  .14*  .12**  .26** 
   Competition (1)    .04  -.20**  .07  -.01  .06 
       Differences    .93*  -.07*  -.07  -.12*  -.19* 
 
Note: entries are non-standardized regression coefficients.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Path model for moderated mediation. 
Figure 2. Mean WOA values by condition, Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 3. Mean WOA values by condition, Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 4. Mean WOA values by condition, Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 5. Interaction between advisor expertise and power on competitiveness, Experiment 3. 
Figure 6. Mean WOA values by condition, Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard errors.  
 
 
Figure 1 
– 
+ 
 –  
 
+ 
+ 
Advisor 
Expertise  
Power 
Competitiveness  
WOA 
Confidence  Power and Advice Taking  53 
 
Figure 2 
 Power and Advice Taking  54 
 
Figure 3 
 Power and Advice Taking  55 
 
Figure 4 
 
 Power and Advice Taking  56 
 
Figure 5 
 
 Power and Advice Taking  57 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 